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THINKING ABOUT POLITICS 
Andre Modigliani and William A. Gamson 
There are distinctive modes  of  thinking about politics, three of which are discussed 
here. A mode consists of  a characteristic domain of relevance, fi l ing system, and 
grammar of beliefs.  A person relying on Mode A treats politics as an extension of 
interpersonal experience.  A person relying on Mode B organizes political thinking 
around a set  of  salient group identifications. A person relying on Mode C v i ews  public  
objects in terms of  their consequences  for col lect ive  goods. The three modes  are 
illustrated by applying them to concrete issues in a hypothetical manner: Vietnam, 
bussing, and attitudes toward presidential candidates.  The concept of surrogate at- 
titudes is deve loped  and various implications of  the theoretical argument are dis- 
cussed. 
Short ly  after the co l lapse  o f  the Army of  South  Vietnam in April  1975, 
an Associa ted  Press r epor te r  did a series o f  interviews wi th  Vie tnam 
veterans  in a small  m i d w e s t e r n  town.  O n e  of  the  in te rv iewees  had  b e e n  
p e r m a n e n t l y  c r ipp led  b y  a mortar  r o u n d  near  Da  Nang. T h e  repor t  of  
the in te rv iew quotes  h im as follows: 
Lately there have been a lot of people saying we should go back over 
there. Well, by God, if they want to go back over there, give 'em a rifle and 
send 'em back over. The only ones I 've heard who want to go are too old to 
fight. Either that or they don't  have any sons or grandsons. In seven years 
there, we were supposed to be training them and we did most of the fighting 
and it didn't help. It didn' t  do any good so if we go back over again and try to 
retrain them and try to help them, I still don't  think it's going to make any 
difference. (pause) We lost a lot of guys over there. I lost a lot of friends. I 
think it's a waste. (The reporter asks him who is to blame for the lost use of 
his legs.) I just don't  know. I don't  think we should have been over there in 
the first place, but yet I was sent over there to do a job and I went and I came 
back wounded and hurt . . . .  No, I guess I can't blame anybody. 1 
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We are concerned in this paper with how people respond to pub- 
l ie  objects. Among the objects that are of particular interest to us are 
those conventionally labeled  "political." By objects, we  mean people,  
policies, institutions, and events. By public,  we mean those objects 
encountered,  directly or indirectly, through a public medium such as 
newspapers  or television. The fact that there is an accounting of  these 
objects in the mass media  makes them public  even if the final channel 
of communication to some individuals is interpersonal. There are dis- 
tinetive modes or characteristic ways of thinking about political objects 
(Lane, 1973). Such modes of  thinking are similar to what  Converse 
(1964) refbrs to as "be l i e f  systems. ''2 We prefer the idea of mode of 
thinking, because we  wish to emphasize an active mind, one which is in 
the process of thinking about  public objects. We are concerned with the 
operation of the black box-- the box that connects a political stimulus 
with some attitudinal or behavioral response. We are not satisfied with 
reducing the complex body of thought in the mind of the Vietnam 
veteran quoted above to some simple valence code such as pro or anti, 
hawk or dove. We seek a way of characterizing the mode of thought that 
he employs in an effort to capture something more of the richness and 
complexity contained in his answers. 
We will argue here that there are a l imited number  of general modes 
of  thinking about  politics. We will single out three, but  without  claim- 
ing at this point that they are necessarily exhaustive. Some of us use all 
three modes; others may use only one or two. No mode is bet ter  than 
any other: the distinctions we will be making among the modes are not 
invidious ones. We do not see them as hierarchical or as stages of 
development ,  and warn the reader against treating our modes  as 
"higher" or " lower" ways of  thinking. We suspect  that most people  rely 
on a predominant mode.  However ,  it is not our intention or desire to 
classify individuals through our distinctions bu t  to understand differ- 
ent ways of thinking about  politics. 
THE NATURE OF MODES OF THINKING ABOUT PUBLIC OBJECTS: THE MODEL 
In describing the three modes, we operate with a general model  of 
how people  think about  public objects. The model is descr ibed as 
follows. A continual stream of public objects passes before us. We 
select from this stream certain ones to at tend to; these enter  ourdomain 
of  relevance. We are able to assimilate only certain parts of  this domain 
because  of the nature of our filing system; some things we are unable to 
file or assimilate. Final ly we develop an orientation toward the object; 
we  apply to it a grammar of beliefs. If  this process is completed,  then 
THINKING ABOUT POLITICS 
Object discussed in the l J mass media j 
inottentio/ otte!ti~-n 
I domainof } 
[ nan-attitude I relevance -- 
j I non-assimilation assimilation 
j 
Looo o.i,o ol 
disorientation " orientation 
/ ; 
[ n o n - e ~  [ grl~eml~sr o,'-~ 
1 t 
L art,rude ] 
Figure 1. The Nature of a Mode. 
the  pub l i c  object  is i m b u e d  with m e a n i n g  and  valence,  and  we  can say 
that  we have an a t t i tude  toward  it. This  m o d e l  is d e sc r i b e d  in more  
detai l  be lo w  and is s u m m a r i z e d  in F igu re  1. 
Step One: Attention 
As objects  pass be fo re  us, some are o f  in te res t  to us and some are not. 
O f  course ,  this is a man ipu l a t ed  process  s ince it is diff icul t  to avoid 
a t t end ing  to eer ta in  ob jec t s  w h e t h e r  we  are in te res ted  in t h e m  or not. It 
is not  the  social p rocess  by  which  cer ta in  things are ca l led  to one 's  
a t t en t ion  that is of  e o n c e r n  he re  but ,  ra ther ,  the  social -psychologieal  
p rocess  by  which  a p e r s o n  fbeuses a t t en t ion  on those things that  he  
cares about .  3 We a s sume  that  e v e n ; b o d y  has a domain of relevance 
d e t e r m i n e d  by  the i r  pe r sona l  goals or concerns .  When  t h e y  e m p l o y  a 
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particular mode of thinking about public  objects, they are guided by a 
general question or inclusion rule. Each of  the three modes  has a 
charaeteristic inclusion role to answer the question: Is this something 
that eoncerns me? This rule selects what is included in the domain. We 
can expect  much variation in the content of what is included among 
individuals and this variation will exist within modes as wel l  as among 
them. Some people are concerned quite  a bit about a Presidential 
election or peace in the Middle East and include a great many political 
objects in their domain of relevance. Others, for whatever  reasons, 
don't  have many political objects in their domain. Our primary eoneern 
here is not with individual variations but  with variations among modes. 
The first question we ask for a given mode is: What is the inclusion rule 
for its domain of relevance? 
Step Two: Assimilation 
Once something is in our domain of relevance, we assimilate it by 
placing it in one or more eategories o f  our  f i l i n g  s y s t e m .  This concept  is 
similar to what Rosenberg  and Abelson (1960) call the "cognitive file.'" 
We locate the object by deciding what previously filed objects it is like. 
We may locate it in several different categories simultaneously. Each 
mode has a characteristic basis of classification for its filing system. The 
categories of the filing system are keyed  to this basis. Again we can 
expect  much variation in the categories that individuals use, even 
among those employing the same mode.  Some sections of an individu- 
al's file may be tightly packed with entries, while other sections are 
nearly empty; parts of  one's  filing system will be  finely differentiated 
while other parts will be quite gross. No doubt  some individuals have 
mostly empty drawers while others have files as stuffed as the FBI's. 
Our primal3 ~ concern is not with individual variations bu t  with var- 
iations among modes. The second quest ion we  ask for a given mode is: 
What attributes are u s e d t o  distinguish among and to categorize public 
objects? What is the basis of classification? 
Step Three: Orientation 
Onee an object is filed, we apply to it a set of beliefs relating the 
relevant file categories to other idea elements.  These beliefs may be 
both normative and empirical. We call the set of such beliefs a g r a m -  
mar .  4 Orientation is a process of applying a grammar of bel iefs  to an 
object  that has been  assimilated into categories in a filing system. We 
assume that each individual has some grammar of beliefs. One is able to 
deal with an object because  it is like other things that one has thought 
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about  in the past. The  rules or beliefs that govern one's orientation to 
these already considered objects are appl ied to the new object. Each 
individual 's grammar of  beliefs has a particular content. Some individ- 
uals have a relatively powerful  grammar that enables them to draw a 
wide  array of  implications; in effeet, they are able to bring to bear  a rich 
armature derived from much past reading, conversation, and thought. 
Others have relatively few idea elements connected with most of  their 
categories. Again, our concern is not with individual differences but  
with the characteristic grammars of each of the three modes. The third 
quest ion we ask for a given mode is: What is the structure of its grammar 
of beliefs ? 
A mode,  then, involves three structural elements: a domain of rele- 
vanee, a filing system, and a grammar of beliefs. These elements  com- 
bine  to form a characteristic general structure. Since a mode exists in a 
single mind, we assume that the three structural elements articulate 
with each other to provide an integrated and coherent way of  thinking 
about  public objects. We do not expect  the different parts of a mode to 
be  independent  but  to be  fimctionally interrelated. 
Before we attempt to give concrete form to this highly abstract and 
general model, we would like to note an important assumption here. As 
Figure 1 indicates, only if  all of the above steps are completed is it 
meaningful to talk about  someone as having a full-fledged attitude 
toward an object. The process ofprodueing an attitude may abort at any 
of  three points. First, a person may be inattentive. Second, he may not 
be  able to assimilate the object because  his filing system lacks the 
appropriate categories or is insufficiently differentiated. Third, when 
he applies his grammar of  beliefs for orientation, it may contain malay 
contradictions and inconsistencies, resulting in confusion and dis- 
orientation. A nonatt i tude does not mean that a person will produce  no 
response. If  asked a quest ion about the object  by a survey interviewer,  a 
person will give some appropriate answer, but  it will have little or 
nothing to do with the object  in question. Converse (1970) suggests that 
many survey questions elicit sueh nonatti tudes from respondents  who 
"with no real attitudes on the matter in question . . .  [feel] for some 
r e a s o n . . ,  obliged to try a response to the item . . . .  When attitudes are 
asked for in such a [survey research] setting, people are remarkably 
obliging." 
TYPES OF MODES 
To prevent  the diseussion of the modes from becoming exeessively 
abstract, we will employ  a device. We will suppose some individuals, 
each of  whom relies exclusively on a single mode in responding to two 
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concrete issues: the end of the war in Vietnam and court-ordered 
bussing to achieve racial integration of schools. This concretizing de- 
vice runs the danger that the reader will mistakenly think of this 
typology as a way of distinguishing individuals rather than modes of 
thinking, but  it simplifies the presentation considerably. We will pro- 
ceed by sketching each mode as a whole  before discussing its parts 
more systematically. The person relying on Mode A treats politics as an 
extension of interpersonal experience. He  has learned certain rules of 
thumb for dealing with the social world he encounters in his immedi- 
ate, everyday life, and he treats public objects by  extending these rules 
to those objects that seem to affect him in concrete ways. Sometimes he 
has difficulty finding applicable rules and can't easily render  such 
objects meaningful. Some of his attitudes may be mediated by surro- 
gates: friends whose judgment  he respects or public figures who seem 
to reflect his code of personal conduct. The person relying on Mode B 
organizes his political beliefs around a set of salient group identifica- 
tions. He  recognizes that political events affect different groups in 
different ways. His world contains a "we"  and "they" or a series of 
such. Like our first person, he may also have difficulty determining 
how some public events will affect his concerns. His attitudes may be 
mediated by surrogates: friends who share his solidarities or public 
figures who seem to speak for groups with whom he identifies. 
The person relying on Mode C views public objects in terms of their 
consequences  for given states of collectivities in which she partici- 
pates. ~ These system states are states of  the social world that she would 
like to see achieved or maintained. They may range from abstract states 
such as liberty and equali ty to concrete ones such as clean water  and 
safe streets. In this mode, a person is responding in terms of  the effects 
of public objects on collective goods--goods which are available to all 
members  of the collectivity if they are produced at all. 6 We acknowl- 
edge that in many eases her desire that such goods be produced may 
mask a solidarity group or concrete personal interest, but  if she is using 
Mode C, the system states have acquired functional autonomy as a way 
of thinking about politics. She reacts to public objects by how they 
affect these collective goods without direct reference to subgroup or 
personal interests that may ultimately support  her beliefs. Like persons 
using other modes, she may need guidance on how given objects affect 
her concerns. Some of her  attitudes may be mediated by surrogates: 
friends who share her desired system states or public figures who seem 
to share her goals for the system. Having sketched each mode briefly, 
we will now present  each one in detail. We will do this by  applying the 
modes to concrete hypothetical examples on Vietnam and bussing. To 
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avoid associating a given mode with any particular valence or "s ide"  on 
these issues, we will present  two contrasting examples of each mode in 
operation on each side of the two issues. 
Mode A: Personal Experience 
People  using this mode  attend to politics if political events impinge 
on their  lives in a concrete  way. We include here effects on family and 
friends. Those who are attempting to lead lives of quiet  dignity under  
diffieult circumstances may have quite a l imited domain of  relevance 
when  it comes to politics. Much of  what is covered on the f¥ont page of  a 
daily newspaper  or on the television news is likely to seem very remote 
indeed,  without any obvious relevance. The pell-mell American exit 
from Vietnam is a good example of an event  that is unlikely to be  in the 
domain of relevance of most people operating in this mode. During the 
per iod in which more than half a million Americans were stationed in 
Vietnam, some might very well  have a friend, relative, or a friend's son 
in danger, and the war might enter  their domain. By 1975, the war 
would  have lost its sal ience for most such people.  For the purposes  of 
our example, we  will assume an individual for whom the war is still 
salient. Perhaps the person is a disabled veteran of  the war, such as the 
man quoted at the beginning of  this paper. Perhaps she is the mother  of 
one of the 56,000 Americans killed there. Connected with such an 
important personal experience,  the Vietnam war is likely to remain in 
the domain of  relevance even though the events  leading to the personal 
consequences  occurred in the past rather than the present. 
The filing system of someone relying on this mode is based on types 
of interpersonal situations. We assume that there will be  great variety 
among individuals in the content of their categories, and hence  we are 
unable  to say as much about  them in general as we would like. We hope 
that there are certain wide ly  used categories that can be  discovered 
empirically. For example,  a person may typically classify his interac- 
tions into those with friends and intimates, those with associates, those 
with subordinates or superordinates, and those with people  who are 
basically hostqe. He  may classify his interactions be tween  those that 
have pleasant personal consequences  and those that don't. In any 
event,  we  assume that he has some classification of types of  interper- 
sonal situations that enables  him to frame the activities in which he 
engages in his daily life. To assimilate a political object, he must 
de termine  in which of  his files it belongs. His classification need  not 
have such propert ies  as mutuaJ exclusiveness  or exhaust iveness.  
Hence ,  he may decide  that a political event  is like several types of 
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interpersonal situations he knows, or like none at all. With the freedom 
that our hypothetical ease gives us, we will assmne an individual who 
has a category of "fighting" to which he can assimilate the Vietnam 
War. The American exit from Vietnam is the end of a fight. We still don't 
know what his attitude will be until we know what he thinks about 
fights. To complicate matters further, "fighting" may not be the only 
relevant category. Vietnam involvement might also be classified as a 
job or task voluntarily undertaken. 
The grammar of beliefs of someone using this mode consists of 
beliefs about personal conduct in interpersonal situations. Some of 
these beliefs may be prescriptive: for example, "Do unto others as you 
would have them do unto you," or "Look before you leap." Others may 
be empirical generalizations: for example, "Blue-eyed people are un- 
trustworthy," or "People are more likely to keep promises if they make 
them publicly.'" Individuals operating in this mode have certain fa- 
vorites which they have inherited from parents or learned in other 
ways. They use them to apply lessons about interpersonal situations to 
politics. To know" how a person operating in this mode will respond to 
the American withdrawal from Vietnam, we need to know the content 
of his grammar. We suggested earlier that one applicable part of the 
grammar is that dealing with fights. There are potentially many differ- 
ent beliefs that might be part of such a person's grammar. For example, 
he might give high priority to the belief, "'Don't get involved in other 
people's quarrels" and "Turn the other cheek." Conversely, or simul- 
taneously, he might give priority to "Everyone should help a friend in 
need," and "'Only a coward runs from a fight." If the war also happens to 
be categorized as a job undertaken voluntarily, then such beliefs as 
"'Fish or cut bait," and "Anything worth doing is worth doing well" may 
be applied also. 
The grammar of a mode is its heart--it  determines much of the 
meaning and valence that an individual will ultimately attach to those 
political objects that she attends to and can assimilate. Most grammars 
contain potential contradictions. This may create no problem with 
many objects since the contradictory elements may not be simultane- 
ously activated. If they are, the individual will get confused and fluctu- 
ate in a volatile fashion as first one rule and then its opposite seems 
salient. Frequently, she will be able to keep them sufficiently com- 
partmentalized so that basically consistent ones will be operative and 
she will produce a relatively stable attitude toward the object under 
most circumstances. Predicting what a real individual thinks about 
Vietnam or any other issue requires that we know not only the mode 
being used but something of the content. This is an empirical task. It is 
important to know the mode for interpreting what a person is saying. 
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We p ro v id e  two v igne t t e s  o f  individuals  us ing  a persona l  e x p e r i e n c e  
m o d e  to i l lustrate h o w  such  a mode  migh t  be  appl ied  to Vie tnam:  
Person #1: I 've been  following the war news beeause I had a son over 
there who was killed about three years ago. I never did understand what he 
died for--you know, what we were fighting for. But it doesn't seem to me 
that it could have been worth the lives of all those American boys. Mind you, 
I hoped the South Vietnamese could do the job on their own, but if they 
can't, that's their problem and not ours. As fbr those arguments about fight- 
ing for our country and for justice, they just don't make much sense to me. 
Where is the justice in having my son killed and my friends' sons killed? 
What good does it do for the country? It's just nonsense and I'm glad we're 
finally out of it. 
Person #2: I don't know whether we should have been in there or not but I 
do know this: Nothing good comes from running away from a fight. If people 
see that you are weak-willed wld unwilling to follow through on something 
you started, they will take advantage of you. Maybe that's not the best place 
to stand up and fight for what we believe in, but sooner or later, we are going 
to have to show that we can't be pushed around. World War II proved tlmt. 
Millions of people were killed because we didn't stop Hitler early when we 
had our best chance. I fought in that war and I lost a lot of friends. I know a lot 
of people say we shouldn't have gotten involved in Vietnam and perhaps 
they're right. But once we got involved, it was our fight too and a lot of people 
were depending on us. We shouldn't have let those people down. 
Apply  the  same m o d e  to buss ing to a c h i e v e  racial in tegrat ion.  For  
some,  it is a r emo te  issue,  h a p p e n i n g  in o t h e r  communi t i e s  to o ther  
peop le .  In  commun i t i e s  w h e r e  the black popu la t ion  is neg l ig ib le ,  for 
example ,  most  inhabi tan ts  are un l ike ly  to p e r c e i v e  any direct ,  concre te  
effects  on  the i r  pe r sona l  lives. Even t s  occur r ing  a round  this social 
con t rove r sy  wou ld  not  fall in the  d o m a i n  o f  r e l evance  of  p e o p l e  us ing  
this mode .  I f  our  hypo the t i ca l  pe r son  h a p p e n s  to be  a r e s i d e n t  of  
Ro xb u ry  or South  Boston,  it is ex t r eme ly  l ikely  to be  in h e r  d o ma i n  of  
r e l evance .  I f  she does  not  he r s e l f  have  ch i l d r e n  who wou ld  b e  bussed ,  
she  is a lmost  cer ta in  to have  fr iends or ne ighbors  who  are i n t ense ly  
con ce rned .  In  any" even t ,  we  will  a s sume  a pe rson  with a ch i ld  who,  
u n d e r  a cour t  o r d e r e d  in tegra t ion  plan, w o u l d  be  bussed  to a school  in a 
ne ig hb o r in g  commun i ty .  T h e r e  are m a n y  ways  in which  this complex  
s t imulus  even t  cou ld  be  fi led.  For  our  example ,  we will a s sume  that  the 
pe r so n  has a ca tegory  o f  even t s  involun ta r i ly  affect ing family  m e m b e r s  
and int imates,  i nc lud ing  a subca tegory  of  po ten t ia l ly  dangerous  events .  
We will  fur ther  a s sume  that  "p ro tec t  yo u r  loved ones from d a n g e r "  
occup ies  a central  p lace  in he r  g rammar  of  bel iefs .  Such a p e r so n  migh t  
express  he r  a t t i tude  as follows: 
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Person #3: I don't care what they do about bussing anywhere else in the 
country--they can do what they like, it's no skin offmy back. I have nothing 
against black people. I'm all for civil rights. I believe they have rights and are 
entitled to demand certain things. I think they deserve the best education 
they can get. I'm for those things. But I don't want my kid bussed somewhere 
where there might be danger or at the very least disruption in the way the 
sehool operates. So I'm against the bussing of my son and of the sons and 
daughters of others who feel as I do. As fbr the more general, philosophical 
arguments on either side of the issue-the supreme court decisions and the 
rights of this person and that person--I don't follow those things. They don't 
interest me. 
Or, alternatively, if  it is classified as less dangerous: 
Person #4: I don't really see that it makes that much difference. Bussing 
itself doesn't hurt anybody, I took busses to school and it's nothing to make a 
fuss about. I want my kid to get a good education. It's not clear that the school 
he goes to now is all that great. It's all the eontroversy and fuss that is making 
for problems. If people would just quiet down and get on with the job of 
edueation, I think it would be better for everybody. 
Mode B: Solidarity 
People using this mode attend to polities if political events affect 
groups with which they identify. There are two important variants of 
this mode. In one, the individual has a single overriding group identifi- 
cation. This is espeeially likely to be true of minority group members 
such as blacks or Jews, but might include workers or other bases of 
solidarity besides ethnicity. In the second variant, the individual has a 
series of group identifications of varying levels of intensity. For most 
people in either variant, much of what is covered on the front page of a 
daily newspaper or on the television news is not likely to have much 
obvious relevance for their identification groups. 7 In our example, we 
will assume that the person relying on this mode is black and has a 
strong black identification. There is no strong reason to expect the 
withdrawal from Vietnam to be in her domain of relevance. Although an 
argument can be made that a disproportionate cost of the war fell upon 
black people, there is little evidence to suggest that most black people 
saw the war as differentially affecting their  group. To make this issue 
part of her domain of relevance, we will assume that she also has a 
strong identification with the solidary group "Americans." 
The filing system of a person relying on this mode is made up of 
groups, some her own, some neutral, and some hostile. The filing 
system not only contains categories but  cross-references based on re- 
lationships among groups. Thus, she can assimilate not only events that 
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affect her  own groups but  those that affect other  groups in her  files. The  
act of assimilating a publ ic  object involves classifying it with other 
objects that affect group interests in a similar way. For a person relying 
exclusively on this mode,  every public  object that is assimilated is a 
solidarity issue. The  grammar of beliefs of someone using this mode 
eonsists of  beliefs about  intergroup relations. These beliefs govern the 
ob l iga t i ons  t oward  o n e ' s  f e l low m e m b e r s  and toward  var ious  
categories of outsiders. Examples from the grammar of beliefs include 
such things as: " I f  we don ' t  hang together, then surely we shall all hang 
separately";  "May my country always be right, but my country right or 
wrong";  "Now is the t ime for all good men to come to the aid of the 
party";  "Don ' t  wash dirty l inen in public";  "Don ' t  bad mouth a brother  
to an outsider";  "Blood is thicker than water";  "'My enemy's  enemy  is 
my friend, my friend's enemy  is my enemy" ;  and "In a fight be tween  a 
group member  and an outsider, always back the group member . "  
As always, we need  to know more about the content of the filing 
system and grammar of beliefs before we can predict how a person 
using this mode thinks about  the Vietnam withdrawal. An example of 
such a person using this mode might run as follows: 
Person #5: Myself, I'm glad it's over. I never did understand what we 
were after over there. There didn't seem to be anything to gain. And I don't 
have any quarrel with those Viet Cong either. They don't have anything 
that's ours as far as I can see. We never should have become their enemy. 
(Pause) A lot of people were killed--and a lot of them black, too. I'm only 
sorry we didn't get out earlier. As ibr those arguments about patriotism and 
fighting for freedom, I don't know what they are talking about. Our freedom, 
such as it is, was never threatened and there is nothing patriotic about 
supporting an unnecessary war. 
Or, alternatively: 
Person #6: I'm opposed to the withdrawal. How' can anyone support it? 
Look, this is our country, right? Well, I don't like to see our country get 
licked. I'm proud of it and I want to see it be a winner. I don't really know 
how we got involved over there but we are involved now" and nothing can 
change that. In fact, we're involved so much that I just can't see the percent- 
age in ending up losers. We'll just look really bad. That to me overrides all 
those arguments about toss of life and little to gain; or those technicalities 
about a declaration of war. It comes down to this: I'd like my country to be 
number one, always. 
Bussing is likely to be a highly salient issue for a black person who is 
using this mode. Although his attitude may be quite complex, he is 
almost certain to be aware that the issue involves black-white relations. 
Hence ,  if his black identification is central, this issue will be in his 
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d o m a i n  o f  re levance .  As for fi l ing the  issue,  the re  are m a n y  cues  that  
those  w h o  are hos t i le  to his g roup  are o p p o s e d  to court  o r d e r e d  buss ing .  
T h e r e  is no real n e e d  for h im  to get  into the  conten t  of  the  issue to 
ass imi la te  it into his f i l ing system. T h e  i ssue  has a c h i e v e d  a symbo l i c  
status wh ich  makes  the  ass imi la t ion  p roces s  qu i te  easy  a n d  direct .  A 
p e r s o n  us ing  this m o d e  m i g h t  not  rea l ly  care  a b o u t  the i ssues  i n v o l v e d  
in b u s s i n g  p e r  se a n d  migh t  b e  m o r e  c o n c e r n e d ,  ~br e x a m p l e ,  wi th  
qual i ty  educa t ion  for his chi ldren.  H o w e v e r ,  once the b u s s i n g  issue 
b e c o m e s  a b l a c k - w h i t e  sol idari ty  issue,  he  will  r e spond  in t e rms  of  
g roup  loyalty.  Such a pe r son ,  r e s p o n d i n g  in a sol idari ty  m o d e ,  m igh t  
say s o m e t h i n g  l ike the  fol lowing:  
Person #7: Looking at it narrowly, I can see that, in the short run, there 
isn't much in it for me or my people. The sehools are bad over there and our 
kids could get hurt if there is trouble. But I have to take a broader perspee- 
rive. Those white folks that don't want my ehildren in their schools are the 
enemy ofblaek people. We have been fighting against them for 400 years. 
We're not going to stop now. I know that the black groups in town are for 
bussing here and elsewhere and I am too. As for arguments about neighbor- 
hood schools or even equal opportunity, I don't  put much stock in them. I 
mean neighborhood schools are nice, but there are more important things. 
As I see it, it's us against them and we've got to stand together now just as we 
have before. 
Or,  a l ternat ively:  
Person #8: I 'm against bussing. It separates our ehildren and mingles 
them with whites at the wrong time. This is a time when we need to stand 
together and demand our due. This bussing program is no big gift. They act 
as if they're doing us a favor. How can it be a favor to offer someone what 
they're entitled to? Their  real attitude is: "We don't  want you.' So why should 
we associate with them ? It 's bad for us, bad for our pride. And just because a 
lot of whites are against it, doesn't  mean we have to be for it. We can have our 
own program. 
Mode C: Ideology 
P e o p l e  us ing  this m o d e  a t tend to pol i t ics  i f  poli t ical  e v e n t s  affect  
co l lec t ive  goods that  are  impor t an t  to t hem.  D e p e n d i n g  on h o w  b road  
or na r row these  co l l ec t ive  goods are,  such  p e o p l e  inay h a v e  large or 
smal l  doma ins  of  r e l e v a n c e .  I f  the on ly  co l lec t ive  good  a p e r s o n  ca red  
abou t  was,  for e x a m p l e ,  a c lean  and  hea l th fu l  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  she  wou ld  
l ike ly  l ind  mos t  o f  w h a t  is cove red  on the  f ront  page  of a da i ly  n e w s p a -  
p e r  or on the  t e l ev i s ion  news  qui te  i r re levant .  For  our  e x a m p l e ,  w e  will  
a s s u m e  a pe r son  r e ly ing  on  this m o d e  w h o  is c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  severa l  
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states of American society that she bel ieves  are closely interdependent :  
freedom, preservation of  the "American way of life," and national 
security defined in terms of  military strength. Public objeets are in her 
domain of  relevance if they affect these collective goods. The Vietnam 
War is likely to be  in the domain ofre levanee ofsueh a person, although 
it may have arrived there quite late. Publ ie  figures have told her, in 
effect, that the war effort is helpful to the collective goods that she cares 
about. 
The filing system of someone relying on this mode is based  on 
common or similar effects. To assimilate a political object, people  using 
this mode  classify it with other objects that are linked in the same 
instrumental way to their desired system states. The exact content of 
the filing system of a person using this mode, as with other modes,  is an 
empirical question. In our hypothetical example, we can assume that 
"war"  is a category that is related to such collective goods as "freedom," 
"the American way of life," and "national security." The grammar of 
beliefs of  someone using this mode consists of  beliefs relating elasses of 
political objects to eolleetive goods. These  beliefs take eategories such 
as "'war" or "the government  in Washington" and relate them to other 
political objects that are directly or indirectly linked to collective 
goods. We will appropriate the term " ideology"  to refer to a grammar of  
beliefs of  this type. Example of  elements in an ideology include: "'That 
government  is best  that governs least"; "Power  corrupts and absolute 
power  corrupts absolutely";  "'Individual initiative produces a society 
with the greatest good for the greatest number" ;  "The Democratic 
Party, tends to favor a more active use of  governmental power  to solve 
domestic problems";  "Never  get involved in a land war in Asia"; 
"Communism is a threat to freedom"; and "Being strong militarily is 
the surest way to preserve the security of  the country." An ideology may 
have contradictory e lements jus t  as the other grammars may. We do not 
assume that this mode  is necessarily more internally consistent. As we 
use the term here, ideologies may range from sophisticated to primi- 
tive. Without knowing the content of the grammar, we could not know 
how a person using this mode would  respond to the American with- 
drawal fi'om Vietnam. It could be  v i ewed  as the liquidation of  a costly 
b lunder  that was weakening  the country and giving aid mid comfort to 
its enemies.  He  could respond with relief. Or the w-ithdrawa! might be 
seen as an act of  betrayal of  important collective goods that were  being 
de fended  by the Ameriean effort in Vietnam. An example of a Vietnam 
attitude of  a person using this mode  might run as follows: 
Person #9: The way we are running out of Vietnam worries me a lot. 
Communism stands against our way of life. Freedom, democraey, and tell- 
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gion all disappear under Communism. Not that we're perfect or anything, 
but they trample on these things. Right now the Communists have a lot of 
Asia. They are pushing for still more. I f  we let them take South Vietnam, 
they'll just keep right on going. I believe they are a threat to our way of life 
and I believe we should have stayed there to fight them. Those arguments 
about too many American lives being lost and about too much domestic 
unrest don't  move me. War is terrible, but the preservation of our way of life 
is worth the price. As for unrest, there are always people who don't  under- 
stand what is st stake in a war and some of them are troublemakers. But they 
are no big problem; they have a perfect right to protest as long as they do it 
peacefully. 
Or, a l te rna t ive ly :  
Person #10: I think we should have withdrawn from Vietnam four years 
ago. In fact, we never  should have sent our boys there in the first place. I 'm 
not for Communism or anything--I  know they may be a threat to us. But the 
fact remains that the war was never declared. Congress never decided that 
we should get into this War, the way the constitution says it's supposed to 
happen. Johnson and a few Congressmen just fooled us into thinking they 
had the right to send our boys over there. But they had no right and that's 
what always bothered me. That's why the American people never  supported 
this war and why we're  better off out of it. 
To  a p p l y  the  s ame  m o d e  to buss ing ,  w e  wil l  a s sume  that  the  p e r s o n  
r e ly ing  on this m o d e  has  in his f i l ing s y s t e m  a ca tegory  a b o u t  " e x e r c i s e  
of  g o v e r n m e n t a l  au thor i ty . "  Some  exerc i ses  involve  pos i t ive  acts that  
h e l p  to p r e s e rve  the  s ta tes  of  the s y s t em tha t  he  is c o n c e r n e d  about .  
O t h e r  exerc ises  are s e e n  as u n w a n t e d  in t rus ions  of  the g o v e r n m e n t ,  
e x a m p l e s  of  it do ing  th ings  it has no b u s i n e s s  doing. To  u n d e r s t a n d  
w h a t  he  th inks  abou t  b u s s i n g  w e  w o u l d  h a v e  to know m o r e  a b o u t  the 
con t en t  of  his g r a m m a r  of  bel iefs .  An e x a m p l e  of  a bus s ing  a t t i tude  of  a 
p e r s o n  us ing  this m o d e  m i g h t  run  as follows: 
Person #11: I really don't  think it's necessary. Mostly it's been the gov- 
ernment using force to get people to do things they don't want to do. Now if 
these people had done something wrong, well then I 'd  see it. But they are 
just ordinary people trying to run their lives and get their kids through their 
schools. These people  are really upset. I 've  seen the faces on some of them 
and they are really worked up. Well, I 'm against the government forcing 
people against their will unless it's absolutely necessary--like to protect the 
public safety or something like that. Here,  it's a matter of Blacks getting an 
equal education. Well, 1 think they're entitled to that but not through the use 
of force. There are other ways such as improving their schools or integrating 
neighborhoods. 
Or, a l te rna t ive ly :  
















































Figure 2. Summary of the Three Modes. 
Person #I2: I think you've got to comply with court orders. The order was 
based on Supreme Court decisions. Whether you're for bussing or against it, 
you have to allow it to take place. The law is the law and without laws, where 
would we be? Personally, I don't care either way about bussing--I rode a 
bus to school when I was a kid and I never liked it much. But people who are 
resisting bussing are wrong--they're resisting the Constitution. It's like 
George Wallace standing in the doorway of that University. Same thing, only 
it's happening in the North. I know that some people are going to be hurt or 
unhappy but they don't have the right to disobey the law. 
Figure 2 summarizes our initial s tatement  of the three modes of 
thinking about polities. In it, we cross the three modes with the three 
structural elements: domain of relevance, filing system, and grammar 
of beliefs. 
SURROGATE ATTITUDES 
Not everyone is interested in politics. For many people it is a bore or 
a confusing scene. They  find it necessary to deal with political objects 
from time to time because things that they are concerned about are 
affected. However, they are wilting to utilize significant short cuts for 
thinking about politics when  these are conveniently available. This is 
also true ~br the most sophisticated observer of the political scene. Even 
such a person isn't  l ikely to have a fully developed, well-thought- 
through position on every political issue or a knowledgable judgment  
about every public man or woman. The major short cut that we use is to 
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rely heavily on the judgment  of others. Essentially, everybody's  at- 
titudes are mediated, in varying degrees,  by trust and personal influ- 
ence. We will call attitudes arrived at in this fashion surrogate at- 
titudes. Instead of being mediated by applying a grammar of beliefs, 
surrogate attitudes are mediated by other people. Such other people 
may be those one knows directly and interacts with personally, or those 
known to one through the mass media, i.e., public figures. Candidates 
for political office are a particularly interesting class of political figures; 
leaders of social movements  are another, 
Support for a political figure is a form of political trust. It is the 
analogy at a public level to personal inf luence at the level of face-to- 
face interaction. The  process is one of relying to some degree on the 
judgment  of others. This does not mean that one necessarily suspends 
one's own independent  judgment,  although this occurs often enough. 
We frequently suspend our judgment  on an issue because we trust 
other people's judgment  for one reason or another. The extent to which 
an attitude is media ted  by trust or media ted  through a grammar of 
beliefs affects the anchoring of an attitude. By an anchored attitude, we 
mean one reflecting a stable attribute of a person raffler than an offhand 
response to a fleeting stimulus. Well-anchored attitudes will be re- 
liably produced by a variety of different stimulus events. In this sense, 
we distinguish surrogate attitudes sharply from nonattitudes. We re- 
gard them as sufficiently anchored to be worthy of study as a class in 
their own right. It is a hypothesis of our argument  that attitudes which 
are mediated by both surrogates and by a grammar of beliefs will be 
especially well  anchored. They  will be less susceptible to change over 
time, buttressed as they  are in this double fashion. The question of the 
relative stability of attitudes that are only mediated by surrogates re- 
mains open. We reserve the term full-fledged attitude to describe an 
attitude mediated by both in mutually consistent fashion. Figure 3 
expresses this modification of our original model, introducing the sur- 
rogate as an alternative mediator to produce an attitude while  bypass- 
ing the grammar of beliefs. We emphasize again that both pathways to 
an attitude may be util ized by an individual simultaneously, in varying 
degrees. 
The reasons that we use for relying on one or another person's 
judgment  are important and vary by mode.  We argue that there is a 
different basis under lying trust in political figures in each mode.  For 
the personal experience mode, one trusts public figures on the basis of 
their  code of personal conduct. A person relying on this mode asks 
whether  the figure has qualities of personal character or personality 
that bode well for his or her conduct in office. The character traits 
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Figure 3. The Expanded Model. 
emphasized will vary from indi~idual to individual but among Ameri- 
cans they are likely to include such things as honesty, decency, experi- 
ence, trustworthiness, courage, fortitude, decisiveness and the like. A 
person operating in the solidarity mode trusts political figures on the 
basis of the solidarities they exhibit. One trusts those who share the 
same solidarities and show that they are willing to act on the basis of 
those solidarities. A person operating in an ideological mode trusts 
those who give indications that they want and are able to achieve 
desired collective goods. One is likely to be concerned about the 
programs and policies that a political figure advocates and pursues. 
With all modes, such judgments about political figures may be well 
supported or based on flimsy and unreliable information. To illustrate 
how the modes might be applied to political figures, we will imagine a 
group of people during the 1976 presidential primary season, express- 
ing their reasons for preferring a particular candidate. 
For the personal experience mode: 
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Person #13: Well, I prefer Jimmy" Carter, It  seems to me that he 's  a pretty- 
open person, ready to listen to new ideas. He isn't crazy and likely to stir 
things up too much but he might be able to get us out of some of the mess 
we're in. He doesn't  seem reckless. I understand he conducted himself 
pretty well as governor. He made a lot of friends down there and not too 
many enemies that I can see. He sounds like he 's  ready to try some fresh 
ideas and I don't  think that things are going so well that we can afford to 
stand pat with the answers we 've  been using. 
Or,  a l te rna t ive ly :  
Person #14: My candidate is President Ford. You know exactly where he 
stands. He is trying his best  to do a difficult job. The man doesn ' t  have any" 
real malice in him. Things don't  seem to be going so badly that we need to 
break in somebody new. 
F o r  the  sol idari ty  m o d e :  
Person #15: I 'm  for Senator Jackson. I 'm  Jewish and one of the things I 'm 
really concerned about is the survival of Israel. Senator Jackson is the only 
person who really seems to care about the issue. The others make a lot of the 
right noises but you can tell they don't  really care one way or the other. 
They're  just being political. But Jackson has shown in a lot of ways that he's 
really committed. The fact that he's not Jewish is all the better because he 
doesn' t  have to bend  over backwards so that people won't  think he 's  being 
biased. 
Or, a l ternat ive ly :  
Person #16: I support George Wallace. He 's  the only one that's really 
willing to tell them where to get off. I know those kinds of people---the ones 
who call him a "racist" and call those of  us who support him "racists." 
They 're  the ones who live out in the suburbs and never pay" the conse- 
quences of anything that happens. Or they're  pointy-headed intellectuals 
who think they're so smart but then mess everything up with their fancy, 
University developed programs for which we bear the social costs. Wallace 
has got the interest of the ordinary man at heart and the more they look down 
on him and the more they make fun of what he says, and how he says it, the 
more I 'm for him. 
Fo r  the  ideo logica l  m o d e :  
Person #17: I prefer Governor Reagan. He  has a vision of what America 
should be. He hasn't  lost direction as a lot of others have mad still maintains a 
sense of what is really important for the country. He recognizes that exces- 
sive concern with one's image in the world is sentimental nonsense that 
doesn' t  really protect our national interest. He  wants to leave people free to 
pursue their private concerns without too much government meddling. This 
is how we got to be the richest and most powerful country in the world. He 



























































Figure 4. Expanded Summary of the Three Modes. 
showed as Governor that he had enough courage to push unpopular meas- 
ures through that were necessary but difficult to take in the short run for 
example, cutting people off the public payroll. 
Or, alternatively: 
Person #]8: I'm for Mo Udall. He has a long established record in Con- 
gress on a lot of issues and he has shown himself to be a consistent liberal, or 
progressive, or whatever you want to call it. The fact is that he's been on the 
right side most of the time and sometimes before it became terribly popular 
to be on that side. Furthermore, he played a leadership role in Congress in 
lining up others on a lot of important issues for example, on protecting the 
environment. 
Figure 4 expands the summary of the modes in Figure 2 to include 
the different bases for choosing surrogates in mediating political at- 
titudes. 
IMPLICATIONS 
We have sketched three modes that we believe are the most widely 
used by Americans in thinking about political objects. We claim no 
originality for the division into modes based on concrete personal 
experience, solidarities, and ideology. On the contrary, we think that 
much of tile literature on political attitudes and voting of the last 30 
years has emphasized one or another of these modes. However,  there 
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are a number  of implications of  treating the modes as we have here that 
are not obvious. 
Modes as Vectors 
We do not assume that only some small elite has collective goods that 
they care about. On the contrary, we assume that everyone has states of 
the system that concern them, but  not everyone u s e s  these collective 
goods as a basis for thinking about  politics. By the same token, almost 
everyone has some group identifications, bu t  not everyone uses these 
identifications as a basis for responding to politics. Finally, we all have 
our ways of dealing with interpersonal interaction without necessarily 
using our beliefs in this area as a basis for approaching most  political 
events. We personally use all three modes on different occasions al- 
though we rely most heavily on the ideological mode. We know that 
when  we read of  Senator  Proxmire r idicul ing studies of  social 
psychologists, we feel the tug of solidarity outweighing the arguments 
on the merits or demeri ts  of the peer  review system in science. We 
would  not testify eritically before Senator Proxmire about the study of a 
fellow social scientist even though we might have severe reservations 
about  his or her work. Such criticisms, in our solidarity beliefs,  should 
be  reserved for internal "scientific" forums rather than "political" 
forums. Senator Proxmire is not a member  of  our guild. Similarly, when 
we read about Senator Kennedy's behavior at Chappaquidick, we are 
tempted  to make judgments  about his personal character rather than 
attending to his political acts and the political policies with which he is 
identified. Most of  the time, however,  we  rely on an ideological mode. 
To treat modes as an attribute of an individual, it is most  useful  to 
think of them as e lements  in a probabili ty vector. We assume that an 
individual has a weight  attached to each mode reflecting a probabili ty 
of use. We allow for the possibility that some people will use  only one 
mode;  thus they would  have an entry" of  1.0 for this mode  while  the 
other two would carry a weight  of O. It is reasonable to hypothesize that 
most people  have a favored mode. Indeed,  if one lacks any ideology for 
dealing with political objects, such a mode is simply unavailable, The 
person must then choose from the remaining two. Some individuals 
may have no group identifications that are sufficiently salient to be  
applieable very often. If  they also have no ideology, they will simply 
rely on the personal experience mode in thinking about  politics. 
Methods used to diseover the modes people  use must employ  tech- 
niques that have a possibil i ty of  evoking all three modes. The objective 
of measurement  is not to classify people  into modes but  to discover the 
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values of their mode vector. This task will be  simplified considerably if 
it turns out  that a given issue or class of objects is stably associated with 
a single mode for an individual. I f  this turns out to be true, then people  
may be  characterized as relying on a single mode with respect  to a 
specified class of objects. 
The Category of "Politics" 
We are particularly interested in a subeategory of  public events  that 
we consider "polit ieah" This is a meaningful category for us but  we 
recognize that it is not shared by many citizens. Recently, some news- 
papers reported a visit to the United States of a love ehild of  a World 
War II romance b e t w e e n  an American naval attachd and a Soviet ac- 
tress. For  us, this is not a political event;  it does not affect any of  tile 
collective goods whieh are mediated by the polity. However ,  we  are 
ready to grant that others see this as an event  of considerable interest on 
which they have very definite opinions. Newspapers  such as the Na- 
tional Enquirer devote  much of  their coverage to what  are, for us, 
"nonevents.'" In the end, we etaim the privilege that any investigator 
has of'choosing to study responses to publ ic  objects that interest  us, but  
we do not judge others for finding different events more interesting. We 
have a nonattitude toward many events that they may have thought 
about  at some length, In asking about  the political events that interest  
us, we  do not assume that they employ the same category of"politieat '" 
objects that we employ.  
Some Methodological Implications 
We have argued that to understand and interpret  what  a person thinks 
about  a political object, one must unders tand the mode of  thinking he is 
using. One needs to gather information about  the person depend ing  on 
the mode. For example, information on the collective goods that a 
person desires is only relevant fbr understanding his attitudes if he 
happens  to be  employing an ideological mode.  Information on soli- 
darities or codes of  personal conduet  are, likewise, only relevant  under  
certain speeific conditions. Anyone who has had interviewing experi- 
ence in eonducting sample surveys realizes that the survey instrument 
is an imperfect  one, generating a good deal of  noise along with the 
information it invokes. Our argument helps to identify some of the 
sources of  noise. We would  hypothesize,  for example, that in terviewer  
effeets are most pronounced when a quest ion invokes a solidarity mode 
for the respondent.  At such a point, the interviewer's solidarity group 
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attributes become quite salient. If the interviewer appears to be a 
member  of a group regarded as hostile, the respondent is likely to be 
quite careful in revealing her true attitude. If she is responding in a 
different mode, however, the interviewer's attributes are less likely to 
be relevant. Similarly, different question wordings on the same subject 
matter can invoke different modes from a respondent. The resultant 
answers might be substantially different if this occurs, especially if the 
questions concern a topic about which the respondent has thought  very 
little. 
Our analysis also has implications for response set. If an individual 
has a nonattitude toward a particular political object, she is likely to find 
agreement the simplest way" of changing the subject. Disagreement is 
more likely to lead to further questions while agreement is a device for 
creating closure on the present subject. If the question form does not 
allow for simple agreement (for example, a forced choice item), the 
respondent  may achieve the same goal by agreeing with the most 
innocuously worded alternative. From the standpoint of the inter- 
viewer, the answers of such a respondent  may appear inconsistent, 
volatile, and lacking in stability. However, they may be quite consis- 
tent  ~om the standpoint of the person who is responding to other 
aspects of the situation instead of the content of the question. Her 
responses may be consistent with standards for entertaining a stranger 
in her home, for example. Nevertheless, such responses reflect a 
nonattitude toward the object in question. Open-ended questions and 
probes are clearly indicated by our argument. To discover modes of 
thinking, one must invoke the reasoning a respondent is using to arrive 
at his conclusion. To do this, one is better offexploring a small number  
of issues at length rather than asking a few questions on many issues. 
Some closed ended techniques are still quite appropriate. Our analysis 
suggests the importance of filter questions to make sure objects are in a 
respondent 's domain of relevance. There are existing techniques to 
identify dimensions used in classification that may help in invoking the 
respondent 's filing system. Various forms of sentence frames may be 
useful in invoking a respondent 's grammar of beliefs. The development  
of such operational measures lies beyond the scope of the present 
paper. 
A m b i v a l e n c e  
Our model suggests a number  of potential sources of ambivalence. 
We distinguish ambivalence from confusion and disorientation. Am- 
bivalence refers to conflicting valences toward a political object rather 
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than to lack of clarity in its meaning. Our model  suggests four sources of  
ambivalence: 
1. Ambivalence resulting f?om multiple classification in the filing 
system. In our model,  the grammar of beliefs is organized around the 
categories one uses in the filing system. Each category invokes a differ- 
ent  set of  beliefs from the person's grammar. While we would  expect 
the set of  beliefs organized around a single category to be reasonably 
consistent, there is much less reason to expect  that sets of beliefs 
organized around different categories will be  free of contradictions. 
Thus, multiple classification of objects produces a high likelihood of 
invoking some contradictory response tendencies.  
2. Ambivalence resulting from disagreements among surrogates. If 
one relies heavily on surrogates to mediate  one's attitudes toward 
political objects, it is not unlikely that one will find them in disagree- 
ment  on some issues. 
3. Ambivalence resulting from contradictions be tween  surrogates 
and one's  grammar of beliefs. One may have a set of beliefs that leads to 
one set of  conclusions about  a political object  but  find that the surro- 
gates one normally uses hold a different view. 
4. Ambivalence resulting from using different modes. It is possible 
that individuals will not restrict themselves to a single mode on an issue 
but  will use more than one. They may find that the dictates of solidarity 
conflict with their beliefs about how to achieve desired collective 
goods, for example. Contradictory response tendencies from using dif- 
ferent modes is an additional source of  ambivalence. 
Given these multiple sources of ambivalence,  it seems useful  to us to 
assume that ambivalence will be typical of most people 's  attitudes 
toward most objects rather than exceptional. Research strategies based 
on this assumption will look somewhat  different from conventional 
research strategies. 
Grounding the Modes in SociaJ Structure 
We have left unanswered  such questions as how people  acquire the 
particular mode vector that they employ,  how the use of  modes is 
related to soeioeconomic status and education, and numerous other 
valid empirical questions.  We have some guesses about these, but  they 
need  to be clearly dist inguished from hypotheses  derived from our 
argument. As an example of how one might approach such a problem 
empirically, we will take up the issue of whether  people who rely on an 
ideological mode have a "larger" domain of relevance than others. 
First, if one asks the quest ion in terms of public objects rather than 
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political objects, it's not clear that size is a very meaningful question. A 
more meaningful quest ion to ask is which objects are included.  One 
might ask, for example,  how much of the front page of the New York 
Times is typically included.  
We expect  that most news assemblers 8 rely heavily on an ideological 
mode. In judging whe ther  given public figures or events are news- 
worthy, they are likely to ask about the relationship of the object to 
collective goods. Hence ,  the domain of relevance of these news assem- 
blers is likely to correspond to that set of news consumers who also 
employ an ideological mode. Other news assemblers--for  example, 
those who edit a trade association or union paper - -may  use a different 
mode in selecting what  to report, a solidarity mode, for example.  We 
would hypothesize a correspondence be tween  the mode used by the 
news assemblers of a particular medium and that used by the consum- 
ers of that medium. It is important to recognize that not all publ ic  media 
reflect the mode used by the news editors of the New York Times. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Schuman and Johnson (1976) have recent ly  provided a comprehen-  
sive review of the l i terature relating attitudes to behavior. In it, they 
discuss at some length the classic study by LaPiere (1934), in which 
motel proprietors accommodated a Chinese  couple, even though ear- 
lier, in answer to an inquiry, they had refused to make a reservation for 
this couple.  Their  closing statement stands equally well as our conclu- 
sion: 
Leaving aside all the methodological points touched on in earlier pages, 
the result still puzzles us. Did the proprietors picture Chinese only as 
laborers in pigtails and coolie hats, and not even recognize the couple before 
them as Chinese? Perhaps for some the word "Chinese" was like "Wallo- 
nians," . . .  merely a strange-sounding term on which to casually project 
antipathies, but quite divorced from real people. Or perhaps proprietors 
acted, as often suggested, in terms of an overriding belief that the less 
disturbance the better. How shall we find the answers to these and other 
questions? One good way, not perfect by any means but among the best 
available, is to ask, and then to listen as well as we can for each proprietor's 
personal definition of the situation. If we attempt to do this with a concern 
not merely clinical, but with the goal of representing a meaningful popula- 
tion of proprietors, of proceeding systematically so as to avoid bias in our 
inquiry, and of gathering information in a form that can be internally 
analysed and connected to such social categories as age and sex, then we 
have reinvented the attitude survey in its richest form. 
These remarks suggest that standard attitude measurement. . ,  represents 
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p e r h a p s  the  l eas t  i n t e r e s t i n g  con t r i bu t i on  of  m o d e m  a t t i tud ina l  s u r v e y  re- 
search .  S i m p l e  p r o - c o n  d i m e n s i o n s ,  e v e n  i f  e x p a n d e d  to i n c l u d e  m e a s u r e -  
m e n t  o f  in tens i ty ,  cen t ra l i ty ,  or ex t remi ty ,  o n l y  b e g i n  to tap the  po ten t i a l  
wor th  o f  the  su rvey  i n t e r v i e w .  Its d e e p e r  v a l u e  l ies  in its capac i ty  to exp lo r e  
t he  ideas ,  be l ie fs ,  va lues ,  confl ic ts ,  and  e s p e c i a l l y  f rames  o f  r e f e r e n c e  of  
large  and  i m p o r t a n t  popu la t ions .  W h e n  this  is done ,  pa r t i cu l a r ly  in an  
o p e n - e y e d  and  o p e n - e n d e d  way,  the  goal ,  a n d  occas iona l ly  the  o u t c o m e ,  is 
no t  t he  p r e d i c t i o n  o f  h u m a n  behav io r ,  b u t  ra ther  a fu l le r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of  
p e r s o n s  w h o  are  no t  on ly  objec ts  to be  o b s e r v e d ,  b u t  also t h e m s e l v e s  m i n d s  
t ry ing  to grasp the  s ign i f i cance  o f  the  h u m a n  s c e n e  in w h i c h  t h e y  pe r fo rm.  
FOOTNOTES 
I. Ann  Arbor  News, April 17, 1975. 
2. This is a good point to acknowledge our general intellectual debt to two papers by 
Converse (1964, 1970). We see the present work as a fnrther elucidation of the nature 
of bel ief  systems, a task which he began in these essays. 
3. Moloteh and Lester (1974) have an extremely useful formulation of the social proc- 
esses. They distinguish among "'news promoters - - those  individuals and their associ- 
ates (e.g., Nixon, Nixon's secretary; Kunstler, Kunstler's spokesman; a man-who-saw- 
a-flying saucer) who identify (and thus render observable) an occurrence as special, on 
some ground, for some reason, for o thers . . ,  news assemblers (newsmen, editors, and 
rewritemen) who, working from materials provided by the promoters, transform a 
perceived finite set of promoted occurrences into public events through publication or 
broadcast . . .  [and] news consumers (e.g., readers) who . . .  attend to certain occur- 
rences made available as resources by the media and thereby create in their own 
minds a sense of public time." We are concerned in this paper with the processes 
employed by news consumers. 
4. We were tempted to call this part of a mode a " 'belief system" but feared that this term 
seemed as inclusive as "mode."  Furthermore, "system" may be misleading because 
we wish to leave as an empirical question just how closely integrated are the elements 
of any particular grammar of beliefs. 
5. In the interests of promoting nonsexist language, we will arbitrarily alternate the 
gender of our pronouns where convenient. 
6. The economists' concept of collective goods has found its way into sociology and 
political science mainly through the tremendous influence of Mancur Olson's The 
Logic o f  Collective Act ion  (1965). Collective goods can be thought of as desired 
"system states" and the two terms will be used interchangeably. For some purposes, it 
is necessary to distinguish among different properties of eollective goods-- in  partic- 
ular, exclusivity and nonrivalness of supply. Our use here focuses on the first of these 
properties, defined by Olson as an attribute of a good "'such that, if any person X~in a 
group X ~ . . . .  , X ~..., X n consumes it, it cannot feasibly be withheld from the others in 
that group. 
7. The term identification group as used here bears a close relationship to the concept of 
reference group as discussed by Kelley (1965) and Shibntani (1961). Kelley defines a 
normative reference group as "a group in which the individual is motivated to gain or 
maintain acceptance'" (p. 211), and thus one which can set standards to which an 
individual feels motivated to conform. In partial contrast, Shibutani (1961) defines 
reference group as "any identifiable group whose supposed perspective is used by the 
actor as a frame of reference in the organization of his perceptual field" (p. 258). This 
latter definition underscores the notion that an identification group provides its 
adherents with a point of view on public events. Kelley's definition underscores the 
equally important notion that if  the identification group is also a membership group (as 
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is often the case), it will have the leverage to en{brce its perspective by threatening to 
reject nonconformists. 
9. See Molotch and Lester (1974). 
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